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It is well known that certain quantum correlations like quantum steering exhibit a monogamous
relationship. In this paper, we exploit the asymmetric nature of quantum steering and show that
there exist states which exhibit a polygamous correlation, known as collective correlation [He and
Reid, Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 250403 (2013)], where the state of one party, Alice, can be steered
only by the joint effort of the other two parties, Bob and Charlie. As an example, we explicitly
single out a particular set of 3 qubit states which exhibit this polygamous relationship, known as
collective steerability. We provide a recipe to identify the complete set of such states. We also
provide a possible application of such states to an information theoretic task, termed as quantum
key authentication (QKA) protocol. QKA can also be used in conjunction with other well known
cryptography protocols to improve their security and we provide one such example with quantum
private comparison (QPC).
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanical correlations offer many surprises
whenever one digs into the theory to understand its
nature and differences from the classical world. Some
examples include correlations arising from entangle-
ment [1], Bell non-locality [2–4], contextuality [5, 6], co-
herence [7, 8] and steering [9–13]. Such correlations have
the unique and surprising property of being monoga-
mous [14–20]. Correlations between certain parties are
said to be monogamous if they diminish when shared
among more additional parties. A simple example is il-
lustrated by Bell-CHSH inequality [18]: Two parties Al-
ice and Bob share non-local correlations and are able to
violate the Bell inequality. If the state of Alice is also
entangled with a third party Charlie, the non-local cor-
relations between Alice and Bob diminish as the corre-
lations between Alice and Charlie increase. It is there-
fore implied that the Bell-CHSH correlations are monog-
amous. Monogamy of correlations has been extensively
studied and has found widespread applications in infor-
mation theoretic tasks like key distribution [21, 22].
Quantum steering [9] was first introduced for bipartite
parties. In this scenario, Bob prepares an entangled state
of joint systems A and B. He keeps the system B with
himself and transmits the system A to Alice. Alice does
not trust Bob, but believes that the system sent to her is
quantum. Bob’s job is to convince Alice that the system
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he sent indeed belongs to an entangled state and it is
possible for him to steer her state.
While it is well known that steering is monoga-
mous [23–25], a major aspect of it has not been addressed
yet. Steering at its core is asymmetric and although it’s
monogamous from one side, the nature of correlations
from the other side is yet to be studied for discrete sys-
tems, while a number of works have been directed to-
wards continouos variable systems [26–28].
Consider a scenario, where three parties Alice, Bob and
Charlie share an entangled state ρabc. From monogamy
of steerability [23, 24] if Alice can steer Bob, she cannot
steer Charlie and vice-versa. The idea originates from
the resource theory of quantum correlations like entan-
glement [1, 29]. However, the questions we address here
are firstly, how to single out states for which a partic-
ular party (say Alice) cannot be steered independently
either by Bob or Charlie but rather only if they steer
together and secondly, how such states can be used in
cryptographic and communication protocols.
In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of quan-
tum steering for such a scenario. We identify a set of
states for which Alice can share a polygamous relation-
ship with Bob and Charlie, also known as collective steer-
ability of Alice by Bob and Charlie. We lay down the
foundation for identifying the complete set of such states.
Continous variable versions of such states, offering this
collective steering have been found useful in a number
of information processing tasks including quantum com-
munication [30] and secret sharing [31]. We also show a
possible advantage offered by this collective steerability
in the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) pro-
tocols. To that end we propose a new key distribution
protocol, termed as quantum key authentication (QKA),
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2which utilizes these collectively steerable states [26]. The
protocol helps authenticate the claims of measurement
basis of either party by a subsequent measurement of co-
herence. Our protocol proves advantageous in reference
frame alignment, which is an essential part of QKD, and
is hard to achieve using classical communication. Fur-
thermore, it can also be used as a standalone QKD pro-
tocol. The protocol is different than the standard QKD
protocols and is made semi-device independent by the
aforementioned property of collective steerability. The
security of the protocol remains the same as for entan-
glement based QKD schemes [32–34]. QKA also offers
various advantages over QKD and is manifested in the
example we provide in the supplemental material [35],
where it is used in conjunction with quantum private
comparison (QPC) protocols [1, 36, 37].
In the next section, we discuss about collective steering
where Alice is only stterable by Bob and Charlie together.
Using this collective steering we provide a quantum ket
authentication protocol in section III. Finally we con-
clude in section IV.
II. COLLECTIVE STEERING
Since we are solely interested in a subset of states for
which Alice cannot be steered individually by Bob or
Charlie but only by their joint efforts in a tripartite sce-
nario, we start with a tripartite state ρabc prepared by
Bob (or Charlie). Bob sends the subsystem A to Alice
and C to Charlie. Since Alice does not believe Bob or
Charlie, she asks them to perform a set of measurements
and send her the outcomes. Based on the measurement
outcomes, she computes the coherence of her conditional
states. We show that there exist states ρabc for which
Alice is steerable if and only if Bob and Charlie make an
effort together but not otherwise. To find such a set of
states {S(A ← B : C)}, we first find out a set of states
{S(A ← B,C)} for which Alice is steerable by Bob and
Charlie together as well as individually. We then com-
pute the union of set of states {S(A← B)}∪{S(A← C)}
for which Alice is steerable by Bob and Charlie individu-
ally. Our set of interest is the difference of the above two
sets, i.e., Si ≡ S(A← B,C) \ {S(A← B) ∪ S(A← C)}.
We now explicitly find out a set of collectively steer-
able states. First, we focus on to single out the first set
{S(A← B,C)} (set I). Alice will be convinced that her
state is entangled if her system A cannot be written by
a local hidden state (LHS) model
ρBCbc =
∑
λ
P(λ)P(b, c|B,C, λ)ρQA(λ), (1)
where {P(λ), ρQA(λ)} represents an ensemble of pre-
existing local hidden states of Alice and P(b, c|B,C, λ)
is Bob and Charlie’s joint stochastic map to convince
Alice by preparing a state ρBCbc . P(λ) forms a valid prob-
ability distribution such that
∑
λ P(λ) = 1. The joint
probability distribution on such states can be written as,
P(ai, bj , ck) =
∑
λ
P(λ)P(bj , ck|λ)PQ(ai|λ), (2)
where P(ai, bj , ck) represents the probability to obtain
outcome a for the measurement of observables chosen
from the set {Ai} by Alice, outcome b for the measure-
ment of observables chosen from the set {Bj} by Bob
and outcome c for the measurement of observables cho-
sen from the set {Ck} by Charlie.
We consider a tripartite state ρabc distributed between
Alice (A), Bob (B) and Charlie (C). Alice asks Bob and
Charlie to perform projective measurements on their re-
spective systems (B) and (C) on stated bases. We con-
sider Bob and Charlie to perform projective measure-
ments in Pauli eigenbases (or in general on a set of mu-
tually unbiased bases) and communicate the results to
Alice. Upon receiving the results, Alice measures coher-
ences on her conditional states with respect to her Pauli
eigenbases (or a mutually unbiased bases) with the choice
of basis being based on the measurement results from
Bob and Charlie. It can be seen that Bob, together with
Charlie can steer the state of Alice if at least one steering
inequality is violated. Below we provide two such local
unitary equivalent inequalities (see supplemental mate-
rial [35] for more inequalities)∑
i 6=k,j,b,c
p(ρA|ΠbiΠcj )Ck(ρA|ΠbiΠcj ) 6 6, (3)∑
i=j=k,b,c
p(ρA|ΠbiΠcj )Ck(ρA|ΠbiΠcj ) 6 , (4)
Unless otherwise stated we consider  =
√
6 as shown
in [39, 40] for l1-norm measure of quantum coherence
Ci(ρ) of the state ρ with respect to the basis i, {i, j, k} ∈
{0, 1, 2} and {a, b, c} ∈ {0, 1}.
Now, to prove the criteria (3), we consider that the
conditional states of Alice have a local hidden state model
as given in Eq. (1), i.e., ρA|ΠbiΠcj ≡
ρBC
Πb
i
Πc
j
p(ρBC
Πb
i
Πc
j
)
. Thus,
∑
i6=k,j,b,c
p
(
ρBCΠbiΠcj
)
Ck
( ρBC
ΠbiΠ
c
j
p(ρBC
ΠbiΠ
c
j
)
)
=
∑
i6=k,j,b,c
p
(
ρBCΠbiΠcj
)
Ck
(∑
λ P(λ)P(b, c|ΠbiΠcj , λ)ρQA(λ)
p(ρBC
ΠbiΠ
c
j
)
)
6
∑
i6=k,j,b,c,λ
p
(
ρBCΠbiΠcj
)P(λ)P(b, c|ΠbiΠcj , λ)
p(ρBC
ΠbiΠ
c
j
)
Ck
(
ρQA(λ)
)
=
∑
i6=k,j,b,c,λ
P(λ)P(b, c|ΠbiΠcj , λ)Ck
(
ρQA(λ)
)
=
∑
k,j,c,λ
2P(λ)P(c|Πcj , λ)Ck
(
ρQA(λ)
)
6
∑
j,c,λ
2P(λ)P(c|Πcj , λ) = 6.
3Now we focus on to single out the second set (set II),
i.e., S(A ← B) ∪ S(A ← C)}. This is the union of sets
of states for which Alice (A) can be steered individually
by Bob (B) and Charlie (C). In this case, Alice ignores
the results sent by one party while acknowledging the
other. A set of steering inequalities in this two-qubit
scenario, where Alice ignores the results of Charlie, can
be constructed as [39, 40]∑
i=k,b
p(ρA|Πbi )Ck(ρA|Πbi ) 6 , (5)∑
i 6=k,b
p(ρA|Πbi )Ck(ρA|Πbi ) 6 2 (6)
and similarly, when Alice ignores the results of Bob, can
be expressed as∑
j=k,c
p(ρA|Πcj )Ck(ρA|Πcj ) 6 , and (7)∑
j 6=k,c
p(ρA|Πcj )Ck(ρA|Πcj ) 6 2. (8)
We denote all local unitary equivalent inequalities of
Eqs. (4) as the first set and Eqs. (5)-(8) as the second
set of inequalities. It is our aim to look for a set of states
which violate at least one of the first set but not the sec-
ond set of inequalities. This would ensure that the state
of Alice can only be steered by Bob and Charlie together
but not individually.
It is well known fact that a state is deemed steerable if
a steering inequality is violated. However, the converse is
not always true. Thus, there is no definite way to single
out the set of such unsteerable states as is required in the
2-qubit scenario to define the set of our interest (Si). To
overcome this issue, we need to use the tightest steering
inequalities with semi-definite programming and the free
will to choose the bases. However, one may start with
the set of states for which bi-partite entanglements i.e.,
EAB and EAC are zero. For such states, by definition,
Alice cannot be steered in the 2-qubit scenarios.
For example, we consider a genuine entangled state
such as a generalized GHZ state
|ψ〉 = α|000〉+
√
1− α2|111〉, (9)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. For the state, it can be shown that no
inequality from the second set is violated. This is due to
the fact that the entanglement between Alice-Bob (EAB)
and Alice-Charlie (EAC) are zero for GHZ states. On the
other hand, the inequality in Eq.(4) from the first set is
violated for a certain range of α.
In this sense, a non-trivial example would be W state,
i.e., |ψ〉W = 1√3 (|001〉 + |010〉 + |100〉), for which (EAB)
and (EAC) are non-zero (see supplemental material [35]).
However, in the following sections, we will only be con-
cerned about the maximal violation of the steering in-
equality (4) for our quantum key authentication protocol
(QKA). We consider the same set of measurement bases
FIG. 1: Plot of left hand side of Eq. (4) considering Pauli
bases with respect to arbitrary reference frame (see supple-
mental material [35]) vs α for generalized GHZ state in Eq.
(9). For this range of α under the curve, inequality (4) shows
violation.
for Alice, Bob and Charlie. They follow certain protocols
to choose a basis as depicted by these inequalities. For
each inequality or protocol and a fixed set of measure-
ment bases, there must be an unique state violating the
inequality maximally. For example, the state (9) shows
the maximal violation at α = 1√
2
only for the inequality
(4) as shown in Fig. (1).
III. QUANTUM KEY AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOL
The non-local features of collectively steerable states
can be exploited in many information processing sce-
narios where a collective action is required. These in-
clude but are not limited to reference frame alignment
for key distribution [41–43], secret sharing [31], escrow
services, banking and applications in QPC. We briefly
explore some of the scenarios below
Let us consider a scenario in which Bob and Charlie
wish to share a secure key. They have fixed a protocol for
the same, which includes performing projective measure-
ments in various pre-determined bases. At the end of the
protocol, both the parties disclose the choice of basis of
measurements but not the results which are kept as part
of the key. They keep only those results as key for which
their choice of basis matched. However, it may be the
case that one of the parties claims to have performed a
measurement in a particular basis, when in reality (s)he
has not due to misalignment of reference frames or to
swindle another. This issue is more relevant when their
labs are far apart and there is no way to validate their ref-
erence frames. Collective quantum steering provides us
with a simple solution to this problem. Instead of sharing
a bipartite maximally entangled states (as is usually the
4case for two party entanglement based QKD), Bob and
Charlie share a tripartite GHZ state, such that one of
the parties keeps with himself two subsystems instead of
one. Without loss of generality, we assume that Charlie
prepares a GHZ state and transmits one of the particles
to Bob, while he keeps two with himself. This way they
share an ensemble of GHZ states.
To align their reference frames, Bob and Charlie per-
form Pauli measurements on their respective subsystems
as proposed by the protocol in Eq. (4), while one of the
subsystems is kept undisturbed by Charlie to check for
steering of coherence. The GHZ state exhibits maximal
violation of the coherence complimentary relation [35]
and a local unitary rotation of their bases is needed to
perfectly align their reference frames [35]. Even in the
case when Bob tries to cheat Charlie by not perform-
ing the claimed measurements, steerability of quantum
coherence can be used to verify the authenticity. A max-
imum violation of the steering inequality (4) implies that
Bob has indeed performed a measurement in the claimed
basis.
In a second possible scenario, a third party Alice pro-
vides an escow service to two parties Bob and Charlie.
Bob and Charlie randomly decide on one of the steer-
ing inequalities given by Eq. (3,4) or other inequalities
listed in Appendix B and their local unitarily equivalent
ones. For each of the inequalities, there exists a unique
state which violates it maximally. Alice prepares the req-
uisite state and distributes it among Bob, Charlie and
herself. Bob and Charlie then perform key distribution
among themselves. Alice authenticates the claims of ei-
ther party by measuring the coherence of her state with
respect to bases as directed by either Bob or Charlie. If
the corresponding inequality is violated maximally, Alice
is assured that the parties have performed the claimed
measurements on their subsystems and the key is like-
wise authenticated. We present an example of the pro-
tocol in which Bob and Charlie decide on the steering
inequality (4) with the GHZ state showing a maximal
violation.
Alice prepares the three qubit GHZ state,
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉), (10)
which is steerable maximally by Bob and Charlie together
when they are measuring in the same Pauli bases but not
individually as shown in Fig. (1). Alice distributes this
state among Bob, Charlie and herself. Bob and Charlie
perform projective measurements Πi(θ) (see supplemen-
tal material [35]) on their subsystems and disclose their
choice of basis exactly like in standard key distribution
schemes. Alice then authenticates whether either party
has indeed performed the measurements as claimed by
measuring the coherence on her subsystems and plug-
ging in the various values in the steering inequality in
Eq. (4).
If Bob and Charlie had followed the protocol as de-
scribed by the steering inequality given in Eq. (4) and
used the general measurements as shown in [35], the co-
herence of the state of Alice would have been steered and
the inequality in Eq. (4) violated maximally. However, if
at least one of them had performed the measurements in
a different set of bases, the inequality would not be maxi-
mally violated. Thus, Alice can validate the key based on
the violation of the steering inequality in Eq. (4) without
having any knowledge about the key.
As a standalone QKD protocol, it falls in the category
of entanglement based schemes, for which the minimum
secure key rate can be evaluated as follows. Since the
parties share a non-local state, their measurement out-
comes are correlated to each other which we denote by Π¯.
For the specific example of a GHZ state shared between
the parties, it is seen that Π¯ = ΠbiΠ
c
j . The secure key
rate of the protocol is defined as
rmin ≥ I(Πk : Π¯)− χ(Πk : E), (11)
where we recall that Πk is the measurement basis cho-
sen by Alice while E is the measurement performed by
an eavesdropper Eve and I(X : Y ) denotes the mutual
information between the variables X and Y . The min-
imization is taken over all the measurement basis being
employed by Alice in the protocol. In terms of condi-
tional entropies, Eq. (11) reduces to,
rmin ≥ S(Πk|E)−H(Πk|Π¯), (12)
where, S(X|Y ) and H(X|Y ) denote the von-Neuman
and Shannon entropy of X conditioned on Y respectively.
From a result in [44], Eve’s uncertainty on the key can
be lower bounded as
S(Πk|E) + S(Πk′ |Π¯) ≥ log2
(
1
v
)
, (13)
where, v := max
k,k′
|〈ψk|φk′〉|2 and |ψk〉, |φk′〉 are eigen-
vectors of of the measurement basis Πk and Πk′ respec-
tively. For the specific case of our protocol where Alice
uses mutually unbiased Pauli bases for a single qubit, we
have v = 2. Substituting (13) in (12), we get,
rmin ≥ 1−H(Πk|Π¯)−H(Πk′ |Π¯). (14)
For the example of GHZ states with correlations de-
fined as above, the secure key rate is found to be rmin ≥ 1.
It should be noted that Bob and Charlie will be able to
perform key distribution for any state of the form given
in Eq. (9) with unit key rate when measurements are per-
formed in the same basis. Similarly, for all such states,
the keys can be authenticated using our protocol with
certainty as long as the maximum possible violation for
the state is known and the state shows exactly the same
violation of the steering inequality. For the cases when
5a maximum violation is not observed for the particular
state, the keys distributed between Bob and Charlie can-
not be authenticated. Furthermore, our protocol also
offers an advantage in reference frame alignment which
forms one of the main ingredients in QKD. Although,
the aforementioned protocol falls in the category of en-
tanglement based QKD, it is quite different from the tra-
ditional ones. The protocol is semi-device independent,
in the sense that two interested parties perform key dis-
tribution with the help of a third party who authenticates
it. The key rate and security analysis performed above
are similar to the ones presented in [31]. However, un-
like other standard semi-device independent protocols,
the aim of our protocol is to authenticate the claims (of
measurement) of either party.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we exploit the asymmetric nature of
quantum steering for discrete systems and find the set of
collectively steerable states for 3 qubit systems. We find
that GHZ and W states are good example of such states.
This novel concept leads to new interesting applications
in quantum cryptography and communications particu-
larly, in protocols which need concerted action and con-
sensus among parties. We provide one such application in
the form of a QKA protocol. By the application of steer-
ing of coherence, QKA enables the parties to perfectly
align their reference frames, which is a resource inten-
sive task classically. Furthermore, QKA proves helpful
in detecting dishonest parties in quantum key distribu-
tion. Many contemporary key distribution scenarios deal
with third parties; examples include a customer buying
a product on an online web-portal. The web-portal hosts
various distributors and upon a purchase, authenticates
the transaction between customers and the distributors.
Our scheme functions in a similar regard, albeit in a more
secure manner. Furthermore, it can also be used in con-
junction with other information processing tasks such as
QPC [35].
We showed that states exhibiting the collective steer-
ability prove advantageous in tasks which are classically
hard to achieve. It will be interesting in the future
to explore and develop more new applications of such
states. We believe, exploring resource theoretic proper-
ties of such states and using such states as resource would
provide a deeper understanding of the nature of quantum
correlations and non-locality altogether.
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Appendix
A. Local unitary equivalent steering inequalities
In Eq. (4), we have provided one of the simplest form
of steering inequalities for the tripartite scenario. Other
local unitary equivalent steering inequalities based on the
Pauli bases can be written as∑
i,j 6=k,b,c
p(ρA|ΠbiΠcj )Ck(ρA|ΠbiΠcj ) 6 6, (15)∑
i=j 6=k,b,c
p(ρA|ΠbiΠcj )Ck(ρA|ΠbiΠcj ) 6 2, (16)∑
i 6=j=k,b,c
p(ρA|ΠbiΠcj )Ck(ρA|ΠbiΠcj ) 6 2 and (17)∑
i=k 6=j,b,c
p(ρA|ΠbiΠcj )Ck(ρA|ΠbiΠcj ) 6 2. (18)
It is not difficult to guess the other local unitary equiva-
lent inequalities based on the permutations and combina-
tions of Pauli bases. One can also use arbitrary mutually
unbiased bases (free will) to form the steering inequali-
ties.
B. Example of states with zero bi-partite
entanglements EAB and EAC
Here, we first define Pauli matrices in an arbitrary
Θ direction such that the eigenvectors for σz(Θ) are
|z+(Θ)〉 =
(
cos θ2
e−iφ sin θ2
)
and |z−(Θ)〉 =
(
sin θ2
−e−iφ cos θ2
)
,
the eigenvectors for σx(Θ) are |x+(Θ)〉 = |z
+(Θ)〉+|z−(Θ)〉√
2
and |x−(Θ)〉 = |z+(Θ)〉−|z−(Θ)〉√
2
and the eigenvectors for
σy(Θ) are |y+(Θ)〉 = |z
+(Θ)〉+i|z−(Θ)〉√
2
and |y−(Θ)〉 =
|z+(Θ)〉−i|z−(Θ)〉√
2
. We consider that Alice, Bob and
Charlie— all start with the Pauli operators and perform
measurements on the bases of Pauli operators but the
reference frames of Bob and Charlie are aligned at an
angle Θ ≡ (θ, φ) with respect to that of Alice.
Suppose Bob and Charlie measuring in θ, φ direction.
Inequality in Eq. (1) shows maximum violation for the
state 1√
2
(|000〉+ |110〉) measured in the basis with θ = pi
and φ = pi. The state 1√
2
(|010〉 + |111〉) with θ = pi
and φ = pi violates the inequality in Eq. (2) maximally.
Inequality in Eq. (3) is violated maximally by the state
1√
2
(|000〉 + |111〉) for the measurement with θ = pi2 and
φ = 0. Inequality in Eq. (4) is violated maximally by the
state 12 (|010〉 + |011〉 + |110〉 + |111〉) for θ = pi2 , φ = pi.
The next inequality in Eq. (5) shows maximum violation
for the state 1√
2
(|000〉 + |110〉) and θ = pi2 , φ = 3pi2 . For
the state 12 (|010〉+ |011〉+ |110〉+ |111〉) inequality in Eq.
(6) is maximally violated for θ = 0 and φ = 3pi2 .
C. Example of states with non-zero bi-partite
entanglements EAB and EAC
Let us take a generalized W state of the form |ψ〉GW =
1
5 |001〉+
√
3
5 |010〉+ 35 |100〉. This state gives violation for
set I and set II both. In set I first inequality gives a value
of 17.4464, which is greater than 6
√
6 ≈ 14.6969. Sec-
ond one gives 14.5289 which is less than 6
√
6 ≈ 14.6969.
Third one is violated by 2.92952 which is greater than√
6 ≈ 2.4495. Fourth one give 5.79661 which is more than
2
√
6 ≈ 4.8989. Fifth and sixth one give 5.88952 which
is also more than 2
√
6 ≈ 4.8989. Now we will see what
about the second set for W state. First one give 2.82029,
which is greater than
√
6 ≈ 2.4495. For second one we
get 5.64058 which is more than 2
√
6 ≈ 4.8989. Third one
give 0.893575 which is less than
√
6 ≈ 2.4495. The final
one give 1.77809 which is again less than 2
√
6 ≈ 4.8989.
7On the other hand, let us take the three qubit W state
|ψ〉W = 1√3 (|001〉 + |010〉 + |100〉). For this state in-
equalities of the set I are violated but not of set II. In
set I first inequality gives a value of 15.6835, which is
greater than 6
√
6 ≈ 14.6969. Second one gives 15.6835
which is also greater than 6
√
6 ≈ 14.6969. Third one is
violated by 2.86603 which is greater than
√
6 ≈ 2.4495.
Fourth one give 5.4664 which is more than 2
√
6 ≈ 4.8989.
Fifth and sixth one give 5.69936 which is also more than
2
√
6 ≈ 4.8989. Now we will see what about the sec-
ond set for W state. After tracing out Charlie the en-
tanglement of the reduced density matrix of Alice and
Bob is 23 . First one give 1.84424, which is less than√
6 ≈ 2.4495. For second one we get 3.54606 which is
again less than 2
√
6 ≈ 4.8989. Now after tracing out
Bob the concurrence of reduced density matrix of Alice
and Charlie is again 23 . Third one give 1.84424 which is
less than
√
6 ≈ 2.4495. The final one give 3.54606 which
is again less than 2
√
6 ≈ 4.8989.
D. Authentication protocol in conjunction with
QPC protocol
Since our scheme utilizes GHZ states, it provides an
added advantage in that existing QPC protocols like
Chen’s protocol [1] can be easily modified. In Chen et.
al.’s protocol, Alice prepares a sequence of GHZ states
which she distributes among Bob, Charlie and herself.
After performing a privacy amplification of the quantum
channel, Bob and Charlie perform a projective measure-
ment in the σx basis. Bob and Charlie declare the results
of their measurements in the following manner: if the re-
sult corresponds to their secret message they announce 0,
and 1 otherwise. Depending upon the announced results,
Alice performs a unitary evolution of her subsystem fol-
lowed by a projective measurement in the σx basis. The
outcome to this measurement reveals the equality of Bob
and Charlie’s information. No where in the protocol Bob
and Charlie announce their information publicly.
In the above protocol it is implicitly assumed that Bob
and Charlie’s devices are uncorrelated to an eavesdrop-
per. Such a correlation with an eavesdropper corresponds
to additional degrees of freedom which in turn implies
that the devices can not essentially perform qubit mea-
surements. In order to elevate the protocol to a semi-
device independent status, an additional check in form
of QKA can be implemented prior to the protocol. This
single check serves two purposes: firstly, it can help to
verify the security of the quantum channel to be used and
secondly, it can help to authenticate the measurements of
Bob and Charlie. Such co-joining of two information pro-
cessing tasks, although requiring slightly higher number
of resources (in the form of GHZ states), yields not one
but two advantages over the standard QPC protocols.
In the modified protocol, Alice prepares a long se-
quence of GHZ states of length L and distributes them
amongst Bob, Charlie and herself. Bob and Charlie se-
lect a basis from the set of arbitrarily chosen mutually
unbiased bases to perform the measurements. The selec-
tion made by them is not random, but is rather biased
towards a particular basis. For a length l < L, which in-
cludes all the σz measurements and a randomly selected
equal number of σx measurements, all the three parties
perform QKA as detailed above. For the maximal vio-
lation of inequality (4), the coherence of Alice’s state is
steered maximally, which in turn implies that Bob and
Charlie’s devices indeed perform as claimed and they are
not cheating. For the remaining sequence of states of
length L− l, the parties perform QPC remain untouched
as detailed in [1]. Thus with the help of QKA, we ensure
privacy amplification of the quantum channel as well as
elevate the protocol to a semi-device independent status,
without the cost of using any additional features.
[1] X.-B. Chen, G. Xu, Q.-Y. Wen, Y.-X. Yang, Opt. Comm.
283, 1561, (2010).
